Nov 18, 2025
The Digital Asset Treasury Cycle: What Comes After the First Wave
Every financial innovation moves from imagination to arithmetic, and digital asset treasuries (DATs) are no exception.
About Altuva
Our thesis is simple - there is $15T of public capital trading below NAV and 99% of public companies underperform Bitcoin. So we buy undervalued public companies, sell off all their assets, and then buy Bitcoin with the proceeds. Team’s ex-Oaktree, Blackstone, Elliott, Goldman Sachs SSG - NASDAQ listed and finalising our $500M now. Mission: to become the first “capital recycler” of the $115T public markets.
I. A Cycle in Fast Forward
Every market innovation begins with imagination and ends with arithmetic. The digital-asset-treasury, or "DAT," was no exception.
Eighteen months ago, DATs created something genuinely new - a liquid, regulated bridge between corporate finance and digital assets. A listed company could raise equity, hold Bitcoin, and give investors exposure without the friction of wallets or custody. It was a simple but powerful idea, and for a time it worked remarkably well.
Capital followed quickly. More than 140 DATs listed worldwide, collectively holding over US $140 billion in digital assets and cash. Valuations surged: the median company traded near 1.2 × NAV, while the top decile - Metaplanet, DeFi Technologies, and several small-cap miners - briefly exceeded 5 × NAV. At the height of the boom, the market valued a dollar of balance-sheet Bitcoin as if it were worth five.
But as often happens with good ideas, success attracted oversupply. Issuance accelerated faster than investor appetite, and the very structure that created scarcity began creating dilution. Premiums compressed, liquidity fragmented, and by late 2025 the median DAT now trades modestly below book. The flywheel that once produced exponential NAV/share growth has stalled - not because it was wrong, but because it was overused.
The first wave proved that public-market vehicles can create NAV accretion through treasury strategy alone; the next wave will prove that doing it sustainably requires discipline, recycling, and selectivity.
II. The Familiar Pattern
Every structural innovation follows a familiar arc: discovery, imitation, and oversupply. The DAT market is simply moving through that sequence faster than most. It is a rerun of the oldest script in public markets: too many wrappers chasing too little opportunity.
1. The Mining-Shell Boom and Bust
Between 2010 and 2013, as China's industrial demand lifted metals to record highs, the ASX and TSX became flooded with small "exploration shells." More than 400 junior miners listed between 2009 and 2012, collectively raising an estimated A$56 billion. These companies were built on the same logic that powers every financial wrapper: it was easier to raise money than to deploy it.
When commodity prices broke in 2013 - iron ore down 40%, copper down 30% - the model collapsed almost instantly. Within twelve months, over 70% of those shells traded below cash-per-share, and the average share price declined by 65–80%.
NAV erosion didn't come from projects; it came from time. The typical shell spent A$1–2 million per year on directors, auditors, and compliance - roughly 10–20% of its NAV annually. After two years of inactivity, a $10 million shell became an $8 million one, then $6 million, without drilling a hole.
By 2016, more than half had delisted or been reverse-merged into non-mining ventures. Roughly 80–90 companies were absorbed by opportunistic acquirers, usually at 40–60% of cash value. The remaining few either transformed into new vehicles (biotech, fintech, renewables) or lingered as "zombie listings" for years before being quietly wound up.
The lesson was brutal but clear: in a public vehicle, capital that doesn't move decays.
2. The SPAC Cycle
Fast forward a decade, and the same psychology re-emerged - this time with modern instruments. Between 2020 and 2021, more than 600 SPACs listed in the U.S., raising a record US $180 billion. At the height of the boom, SPAC shares traded at 1.07–1.10× trust value, and warrants valued a dollar of cash at $1.15. It was the ultimate premium-on-liquidity trade.
But deal quality quickly deteriorated. In 2022, redemption rates rose above 70%. By mid-2023, the median SPAC traded at 0.9× trust, and nearly 85% of the remaining vehicles either liquidated or merged below par.
Of the 600 SPACs launched:
Roughly 220 liquidated outright, returning capital minus operating costs
Around 330 merged, mostly at large discounts; the median post-deal decline from $10 NAV to $5.60 in twelve months
Over $10 billion of NAV was effectively lost through operating and transaction expenses
Operating costs were the silent killer: SEC filings show that an average SPAC burned US $1.5 million annually in G&A and deal pursuit costs. Across 24 months of waiting for a merger, that meant 3% of NAV disappeared each year in fees and salaries - the same decay rate that doomed the mining shells.
By late 2023, the SPAC index (De-SPAC ETF) was down more than 80% from its peak. Only a handful of disciplined arbitrage funds - buying at discounts and redeeming for trust value - generated consistent returns. Everyone else was left with wrappers, not wealth.
Mining shells and SPACs show the same anatomy: abundance kills the premium, and fixed costs quietly consume the capital that optimism created.
III. DATs: Today's Version of the Same Story
The first wave of DATs is now in that same middle act - where activity slows, but overhead continues. They have borrowed to buy back stock, sold Bitcoin to cover costs, and merged with one another to create optical scale. None of it solves the core issue: static balance sheets in a market that rewards motion.
Like the cash shells and SPACs before them, most DATs will drift below intrinsic value, losing 5–10% of NAV per year through operating drag alone. A few may pivot to genuine business models or yield-bearing strategies, but most will wait for someone else to give their capital a purpose.
IV. What Happens Next
History suggests that once the market reaches this stage, it doesn't collapse - it decays. The premium rarely returns. Instead, vehicles consolidate, merge, or disappear in slow motion.
For the mining shells, that process took roughly 30 months from the peak of listings to the trough of delistings. For SPACs, it took 24 months from the 2021 issuance boom to mass liquidation in 2023.
DATs are only less than a year into their own cycle. If the pattern holds, the next two years will bring consolidation and attrition. Roughly half the tickers will vanish, through mergers or delisting. By 2027, the category will be smaller, duller - and ripe for new operators to take over stranded assets.
The logic will remain unchanged: when you can buy a dollar of Bitcoin or cash for fifty cents, the opportunity shifts from creation to reallocation. The next winners won't issue new treasuries - they'll recycle the old ones.
V. The Rise of the Recycler
A capital recycler differs from a consolidator. Consolidators add scale; recyclers add velocity. They acquire discounted vehicles, unlock the assets inside, and redeploy the proceeds into higher-return opportunities. Their advantage is patience and math: they don't need excitement, only mispricing.
Brookfield built an empire on that principle in infrastructure - selling mature assets at par and buying mispriced ones. Activist funds like Elliott and Saba used the same logic to close discounts in closed-end funds. In each case, the work wasn't invention but recovery.
DATs now provide the same canvas. Each stranded treasury is a small pile of trapped liquidity waiting for discipline. Buying at 0.5 × NAV and releasing the value back to par doubles capital before redeployment. Add rotation, and the compounding becomes structural.
VI. The Size of the Opportunity
The dislocation visible in DATs is only the tip of the iceberg.
Across global equity markets, roughly 40% of listed companies trade below tangible book value - more than US $6.8 trillion of equity capital priced for stagnation.
Japan: over 1,600 listed companies trade at 0.5–0.8× book
Europe: the proportion of sub-book small caps has doubled since 2020
United States: one in four micro- and small-cap companies trade below 0.8 × book despite record cash balances
Even a 1% penetration of that universe equals US $70 billion of capital recycled. Buying at 0.5× and realizing at par yields US $35 billion of value before redeployment.
The math makes this one of the most scalable post-cycle strategies available in public markets today.
VII. Where Altuva Fits
Altuva was built for this phase. We buy into discounts, not premiums. We acquire balance sheets trading at 0.2–0.6 × NAV, unlock the capital within, and convert it into productive, Bitcoin-backed intrinsic value per share.
Our model compounds because every recycle strengthens NAV, improves equity currency, and expands reach. As others de-risk, we accumulate raw material. Pessimism is our inventory.
DATs happen to be the first mine we're working - but the geology of inefficiency extends across the entire market. The opportunity isn't crypto; it's capital itself.
VIII. Takeaways
Premiums always end. Once valuation transparency meets replication, the market reverts to arithmetic.
Financial engineering can't fix structure. Static balance sheets lose NAV through time, not mistakes.
Past cycles show the timeline. Mining shells and SPACs each took roughly 24–36 months from peak to consolidation; DAT consolidation has just started.
Recyclers, not consolidators, capture the next phase. Reallocation, not aggregation, creates durable IRRs.
The addressable market is massive. Over $6 trillion of sub-book equity globally provides a multiyear pipeline for disciplined recyclers.
IX. Closing Reflection
Every innovation passes through three acts: discovery, imitation, and discipline. The digital-asset-treasury trade has completed the first two. The third has just begun.
This phase won't be about excitement. It will be about the slow arithmetic of value returning to operators who can move capital when others can't.
The market built treasuries. Now someone has to put them back to work.
That, simply, is what Altuva does.
Part II – Analytical Appendix
1. DAT Market Snapshot 2025
Metric | Now (Oct 2025) | Last Year (Oct 2024) | Change YoY |
# of Listed DATs | 142 | 66 | +76 (+115%) |
Aggregate NAV (US $ B) | c.140 | c.60 | +80 (+140%) |
Median mNAV | ≈ 1.0x | ≈ 1.3x | -0.3x |
% Below NAV | ≈ 80% | ≈ 35% | +45pp |
Source: public filings, Bloomberg data, Altuva estimates.
2. Historical Comparisons
Cycle | Peak Listings | Avg. Time to Discount | NAV Loss to Overhead | Delist/Consolidate Rate | Cycle Duration |
Mining Shells (ASX/TSX 2010–15) | ≈ 420 | 12 mo | 15–20% p.a. (est) | > 70% | ≈ 30 mo |
SPACs (US 2020–23) | ≈ 600 | 18 mo | 3% p.a. (est) | ≈ 85% | ≈ 24 mo |
DATs (2025) | ≈ 140 | 6–12 mo so far | 5–10% p.a. (est) | TBD (early in cycle) | Projected ≈ 30 mo |
3. Recycling Economics (illustrative figures)
Entry mNAV | Exit mNAV | Cycle Length | Gross Return | IRR Range |
0.5 × | 1.0x | 3 years | 100% | ≈ 33–36% |
0.4 × | 1.0x | 3 years | 150% | ≈ 45–48% |
0.5 × | 1.0× then re-deploy | 1.5 years | 100% per cycle | ≈ 55–62% |
4. Global Sub-Book Equity Universe 2025
Region | Companies < 1.0 × Book | Aggregate Mkt Cap (US $ B) | Share of Total | Comments |
Japan | 1,600 | 1,200 | ≈ 18% | Corporate cash hoarding persistent |
Europe | 900 | 1,500 | ≈ 22% | Small-cap de-ratings since 2020 |
US | 1,400 | 2,500 | ≈ 37% | Micro-/small-cap stagnation |
Other Asia | 700 | 1,000 | ≈ 15% | Emerging-market discounts |
Total | ≈ 4,600 | ≈ 6,800 | 100% | Altuva addressable market |
Source: public filings, Bloomberg data, Altuva estimates.
